



# Rejoinder: Quantifying the Fraction of Missing Information for Hypothesis Testing in Statistical and Genetic Studies

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# Rejoinder: Quantifying the Fraction of Missing Information for Hypothesis Testing in Statistical and Genetic Studies

Dan L. Nicolae, Xiao-Li Meng and Augustine Kong

## 1. A PROFESSIONAL JOY

Few authors would not be pleased when discussants implement their methods or follow-up on their ideas. It is therefore a professional joy to see every discussant doing both! Our heartfelt thanks go to all discussants, and to the Executive Editor, Ed George, for bringing us such joy!

Incidentally, the three discussions cover nicely the three main parts of our paper. Zheng and Lo's discussion centers on our motivating application, namely, designing follow-up strategies in genetic studies, but with the additional consideration of the uncertainty in the measures themselves. Doss's discussion focuses on the second part of our paper, namely, the likelihood-based relative measure, but with applications to survival analysis where the use of partial likelihood reveals very interesting (and inevitably confusing) complications. Chang, Chen, Chien and Hsing (hereafter C<sub>3</sub>H) comment on the third part of our paper, the Bayesian measures for small samples, and implement variations that are applied to problems in infectious disease research and isotonic regression.

Our responses are organized in the aforementioned order. We very much appreciate all the key messages conveyed by the discussants, though for a few of them we offer alternative explanations. Some questions posed by the discussants make nice Ph.D. or master thesis topics, so we summarize them at the end of this rejoinder.

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## 2. ZHENG AND LO: DESIGN WITH UNCERTAINTY

Zheng and Lo further emphasize the critical role of measuring relative information in designing follow-up studies, and touch upon the issue of optimal design under a given measure. In particular, they consider a setting with multiple variables, and suggest an extension of our harmonic rule (19) for combining multiple studies to the setting of combining multiple variables. Since our rule (19) was derived under the assumption that individual studies are independent, we surmise that Zheng and Lo's setting is under similar considerations, where variables are considered to be independent of each other and their contributions to the overall log-likelihood are additive. Otherwise we will need to consider all variables jointly in measuring relative information. Nevertheless, it would be useful to investigate how Zheng and Lo's combining rule (1) performs as a quick approximation to the measure that uses the full likelihood, when the independence assumption fails. Zheng and Lo's (1) could be quite appealing to a practitioner who chooses to deal with multiple variables separately, especially for testing purposes, because of the technical difficulty in specifying a reliable large joint multivariate model.

Zheng and Lo also correctly point out that the actual test statistics (e.g., log-likelihood ratio) from a follow-up study can be quite different from what is predicted by our measures of relative information,  $\mathcal{R}I_1$  and  $\mathcal{R}I_0$ . There are several different ways of investigating this uncertainty. Zheng and Lo take a direct approach, by simulating the actual ratio of complete-data log-likelihood ratio versus the observed-data log-likelihood ratio, which they denote by  $\mathcal{R}I_y$ , as a function of the missing data. The simulations are done by drawing the missing data from the conditional distribution given the observed data and the parameter value estimated by the observed-data MLE. In the binomial example, a simulation study is used to demonstrate that  $\mathcal{R}I_1^{-1}$  is the average of  $\mathcal{R}I_y^{-1}$ , which itself exhibits considerable variation.

Here we wish to point out a subtlety. Whereas  $\mathcal{R}I_1^{-1}$  has the nice interpretation of being the ratio of the *expected* complete-data lod score to the observed-data lod score, this expectation is calculated under the assumption that the value of the parameter under the alternative hypothesis is the same as the one under which the (conditional) expectation is calculated. There is no confusion about this assumption when the alternative hypothesis is sharp, that is, when it has a fixed known value. This is essentially what Zheng and Lo assumed, as they considered a number of alternative values ( $p = 0.525, 0.55, 0.65$ ) for their simulation studies. It is clear that under such a setting,  $E[\mathcal{R}I_y^{-1}|Y_{ob}; \theta = \theta_{ob}] = \mathcal{R}I_1^{-1}$ , by the definition of  $\mathcal{R}I_1$ .

However, once we move away from this setting and allow the use of the actual complete-data lod score  $\text{lod}(\theta_{co}, \theta_0|Y_{co})$ , where  $\theta_{co}$  is the complete-data MLE, then things can become much more complicated. For example,  $E[\mathcal{R}I_y^{-1}|Y_{ob}; \theta = \theta_{ob}] = \mathcal{R}I_1^{-1}$  no longer holds because in general,

$$(1) \quad \begin{aligned} & E[\text{lod}(\theta_{co}, \theta_0|Y_{co})|Y_{ob}; \theta = \theta_{ob}] \\ & \neq E[\text{lod}(\theta_{ob}, \theta_0|Y_{co})|Y_{ob}; \theta = \theta_{ob}]. \end{aligned}$$

Mathematically, our key identity (13) requires both  $\theta_1$  and  $\theta_2$  to be fixed known constants (given the observed data), so one cannot take  $\theta_1 = \theta_{co}$ , which would be a random variable, even after conditioning on  $Y_{ob}$ . This technical requirement, however, is a reflection of a more fundamental difficulty in measuring (relative) information. If the additional data change the MLE (i.e., from  $\theta_{ob}$  to  $\theta_{co}$ ), which can be viewed as a “center” of the likelihood, then measuring relative information, in terms of relative strength against a null hypothesis, becomes a very tricky task. Perhaps this is more clearly seen by viewing the likelihood function as an un-normalized posterior density, and imagining that there are two posterior densities. One is centered around a value close to  $\theta_0$  with a small posterior variance (i.e., the one based on  $Y_{co}$ ) and the other is centered around a value farther away from  $\theta_0$  but also with larger spread (i.e., the one based on  $Y_{ob}$ ). It is then debatable how to compare the two posteriors’ respective strengths in discrediting the value of  $\theta_0$ ; certainly it is a much harder task than when both posteriors are centered at the same location.

With our measures we circumvent this problem by first calculating the log-likelihood ratio or lod score for the same null value  $\theta_0$  and same alternative value  $\theta_1$ , given both the observed data and complete data.

We then estimate the unknown value of  $\theta_1$ , or even  $\theta_0$  when the null is not sharp, by the MLE under the alternative and null hypotheses, respectively. Alternatively, as we demonstrated via the simple binomial example, when the complete-data likelihood is from an exponential family [which is the case for the binomial when  $p$  is restricted to  $(0, 1)$ ], what we proposed was to measure how anti-conservative our test would be if we imputed the complete-data sufficient statistics under the alternative hypothesis and then pretended that they were real data (for  $\mathcal{R}I_1$ ), or how conservative our test procedure would be if we imputed under the null and then pretended that they were real data (for  $\mathcal{R}I_0$ ).

In that sense, the only uncertainty in our measures is the uncertainty caused by using the observed-data MLEs for  $\theta_1$  and  $\theta_0$ . This is different from Zheng and Lo’s simulation and variance calculation, which attempts to capture the conditional variation in  $\mathcal{R}I_y^{-1}$  given the observed data. However, it is important to point out that, because Zheng and Lo’s setting treats the alternative value of the hypothesis as known, their variation is also different from the actual (conditional) variation in the ratio of the complete-data lod score and the observed-data lod score. The latter would be

$$(2) \quad \frac{\text{Var}[\text{lod}(\theta_{co}, \theta_0|Y_{co})|Y_{ob}, \theta]}{\text{lod}^2(\theta_{ob}, \theta_0|Y_{ob})},$$

which then can be evaluated at  $\theta = \theta_{ob}$ , as Zheng and Lo suggested. Which of these variance calculations is most relevant for practical purposes is worthy of exploring, and we thank Zheng and Lo for their recognition of this issue.

It is worth reiterating here that the range of genetics/genomics applications of the proposed measures of information is expanding with every high-throughput technology that is developed in this rapidly moving field. For example, in many applications, the individual genotypes on the genome are not measured deterministically; instead, a distribution on all possible states is inferred from the raw data. Examples of this include: (i) genotype calling using data from the new sequencing technologies such as those from Solexa and Applied Biosystems, where uncertainty in calls comes from technical errors, sequence assembly and sequence similarity (Brockman et al., 2008); (ii) imputation of genotypes for untyped markers using information from a reference database such as HapMap, where uncertainty is caused by imperfect prediction and by the size of the training data set (Nicolae, 2006); and (iii) calling genotypes of Copy Number Variation (CNV), where the variability is caused by uncertainty in the boundaries of the CNVs and by technical variability in the

probe measurements (Redon et al., 2006). In all of these situations, instead of data yielding a genotype,  $G$ , the raw information is processed into a distribution on all possible values for  $G$ ,  $P(G|\text{data})$ . These distributions can be used, for example, in testing for genetic association of a disease or quantitative trait with the marker under investigation. The measures proposed in our paper can be applied directly (similarly to the haplotype application presented in the paper) to quantify the amount of information relative to having observed the genotypes. The measures are important because it is possible, with additional laboratory work, to determine the genotypes with certainty. The complications arise when information on different markers that are in the same biological unit (such as a gene or a pathway) are combined into a single association test. This is the case where the discussion above is relevant and further research is necessary.

### 3. DOSS: SO WHAT WENT WRONG WITH PARTIAL LIKELIHOOD?

We very much appreciate Doss's exploration of applying our measures to the survival analysis setting, and were very intrigued by the problems he reported with Cox's partial likelihood. As we stated in the first section of our paper, one basic requirement in measuring relative information is that we need to assume that the procedure under investigation is "optimal" in some sense (e.g., being full-likelihood based). This requirement is needed to prevent paradoxical situations where less data can lead to more information, much like the "self-efficient" requirement in Meng (1994). A good illustration of such a situation is a least-square regression in which the variance depends on the value of the covariate. While the ordinary least-square estimators enjoy the robustness in the sense of still being consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity, they are not self-efficient (Meng, 1994) because one can have a much more efficient least-square estimator with fewer data if the additional data happen to be those with much higher variances; see Meng (2001) for a detailed illustration. So Doss's finding, that  $\mathcal{R}I_1$  may not be less than 1 for some of the data sets he used, reminded us to look into the possibility that the partial likelihood approach may fail this basic requirement.

When "partial likelihood" is taken to mean literally any part of a full likelihood, this failure is obvious, because it would be trivial to construct many examples where the part chosen is so inefficient compared with the full likelihood that "self-efficiency" cannot possibly hold (even taking into account that "self-efficiency"

is a weaker requirement than the usual full efficiency). So the question of real interest here is what happens in the specific case of Cox's partial likelihood for the proportional hazard model, an approach that is often considered to produce results as good as the full likelihood method, at least for practical purposes. The answer to this question, however, is not straightforward.

The simplest situation is when there is no censoring, in which case it is known that Cox's partial likelihood for the proportional hazard model is also a genuine likelihood based on part of the data, that is, on the ranks of all the observed failure times (Fleming and Harrington, 1991, Chapter 4). Since it is a genuine likelihood, it must be self-efficient, and there should be no problem to apply our (16) or any subsequent formulas, as long as they are implemented correctly (see below). When there is censoring, the discussion in Fleming and Harrington (1991) shows that a further sacrifice of efficiency is needed in order to arrive at Cox's partial likelihood via the rank-data formulation. Currently we are unable to determine the impact of this further sacrifice on self-efficiency.

What we are able to determine, or rather to detect, however, is that there is another reason that can explain Doss's "surprising findings," even if the self-efficiency issue is not relevant. The problem lies in how one defines *observed data*, and by comparison, what constitutes *complete data*. One might find this is a rather odd inquiry—how hard could it be to determine what is observed and what is missing?

To see why this can be a problem, let us set up the notation carefully. Using Doss's  $D$  notation for data, we distinguish three data sets:  $D_{\text{full}}$  is the full data set that would be observed if there were no censoring,  $D_{\text{cens}}$  is the available/observed censored data, and  $D_{\text{part}}$  is Cox's partial data, that is, the actual data used for calculating Cox's partial likelihood function.

Given this setup, we can use  $\mathcal{R}I_1$  to measure the loss of information due to censoring by setting  $\{Y_{\text{ob}} = D_{\text{cens}}, Y_{\text{co}} = D_{\text{full}}\}$ , using our generic notation; we believe Doss's first reported  $\mathcal{R}I_1$  value, 0.987, is for this purpose. We can also measure the loss of information from using the partial likelihood approach compared with the full-likelihood approach, which corresponds to setting  $\{Y_{\text{ob}} = D_{\text{part}}, Y_{\text{co}} = D_{\text{cens}}\}$ . Doss does not seem to provide such a measure. We remark that we may also measure the loss of information of using  $Y_{\text{ob}} = D_{\text{part}}$  compared with using  $Y_{\text{co}} = D_{\text{full}}$ , though this  $\mathcal{R}I_1$  may not be numerically the same as the product of the previous two because they assume different



observed data in computing the MLEs and take different conditional expectations over the missing data.

The setting Doss provided is, however, more complicated. Imagine that we had collected additional samples, possibly censored. Let  $D_{\text{cens}}^{\text{aug}}$  denote the augmented data set that includes  $D_{\text{cens}}$ ;  $D_{\text{cens}} \subset D_{\text{cens}}^{\text{aug}}$ . We then obviously can ask what is the relative information in  $Y_{\text{ob}} = D_{\text{cens}}$  compared with the augmented sample  $Y_{\text{co}} = D_{\text{cens}}^{\text{aug}}$ . This is, we believe, what Doss intended. However, since Cox's partial likelihood is a very popular approach, Doss wanted to measure the relative information when using the partial likelihood, not the full likelihood.

Because Cox's partial likelihood uses the partial data  $D_{\text{part}}$ , we then should set  $\{Y_{\text{ob}} = D_{\text{part}}, Y_{\text{co}} = D_{\text{part}}^{\text{aug}}\}$ , where  $D_{\text{part}}^{\text{aug}}$  is Cox's partial data from the augmented sample  $D_{\text{cens}}^{\text{aug}}$ . That is, the moment we decide to measure the relative information for using Cox's partial likelihood approach, our relative information is *no longer* about  $Y_{\text{ob}} = D_{\text{cens}}$  relative to  $Y_{\text{co}} = D_{\text{cens}}^{\text{aug}}$ , but rather about  $Y_{\text{ob}} = D_{\text{part}}$  relative to  $Y_{\text{co}} = D_{\text{part}}^{\text{aug}}$ , because the latter are the actual data sets used by the Cox regression.

Recognizing the correct  $Y_{\text{ob}}$  and  $Y_{\text{co}}$  directly affects how we compute, among other things, the denominator of  $\mathcal{R}I_1$ . With  $Y_{\text{ob}} = D_{\text{part}}$  and  $Y_{\text{co}} = D_{\text{part}}^{\text{aug}}$ , the conditional expectation called for by the denominator of  $\mathcal{R}I_1$  of (18) in our paper should be with respect to

$$(3) \quad f(Y_{\text{co}}|Y_{\text{ob}}; \theta_{\text{ob}}) = f(D_{\text{part}}^{\text{aug}}|D_{\text{part}}; \theta_{\text{ob}}).$$

However, the conditional distribution Doss actually used in his Monte Carlo simulation appears to be

$$(4) \quad f(\tilde{Y}_{\text{co}}|\tilde{Y}_{\text{ob}}; \theta_{\text{ob}}) = f(D_{\text{cens}}^{\text{aug}}|D_{\text{cens}}; \theta_{\text{ob}}).$$

The critical difference between (3) and (4) is in what is being conditioned upon, namely,  $D_{\text{part}}$  versus  $D_{\text{cens}}$ . (The difference between  $Y_{\text{co}}$  and  $\tilde{Y}_{\text{co}}$  is less important here because  $D_{\text{part}}^{\text{aug}}$  is a deterministic function of  $D_{\text{cens}}^{\text{aug}}$ , so if we can calculate or simulate with respect to a correctly specified conditional distribution of  $D_{\text{cens}}^{\text{aug}}$ , then we can do so for any of its functions/margins.) We point out this difference because the use of (3) is consistent with our original definition, as it uses the same *observed data* set for both the numerator and denominator of  $\mathcal{R}I_1$ . Using (4), however, will result in unclear consequences. For one thing, our key inequality (16) is no longer guaranteed to hold because the "Kullback–Leibler information" part would then be of the form  $\int p_1(x) \log[p_2(x)/p_0(x)]\mu(dx)$ , which is not guaranteed to be nonnegative when  $p_1(x) \neq p_2(x)$ .

Doss's explanation of his "surprising findings" is also based on an inconsistency, but it is the inconsistency between including some censored observations for the denominator versus only using the uncensored cases for the numerator. Our investigation above, however, reveals that the problem lies in using the ranks of the failure times, as in  $D_{\text{part}}$  and  $D_{\text{part}}^{\text{aug}}$ , which is not the same as using the failure times themselves, as in  $D_{\text{cens}}$  and  $D_{\text{cens}}^{\text{aug}}$ . This difference is irrespective of censoring, because even without censoring, in which case  $D_{\text{cens}} = D_{\text{full}}$ , the critical difference between the conditioning in (3) and in (4) remains.

Intriguingly, the need for setting up notation carefully is demonstrated by another more subtle difference between (3) and (4), at least when there is no censoring. In both (3) and (4), we used the generic notation  $\theta_{\text{ob}}$  to denote an estimator of  $\theta$  based on the observed data. However, in the current setting,  $\theta$  consists of both the parameter of interest,  $\beta$ , and the (infinite-dimensional) nuisance parameter  $\Lambda_0$ , the baseline cumulative hazard. This recognition immediately reveals a problem for (3), because there is little information in  $D_{\text{part}}$  for estimating  $\Lambda_0$ . After all, the most celebrated feature of Cox's partial likelihood is its ability to estimate  $\beta$  without having to deal with  $\Lambda_0$ .

When there is no censoring, this problem also turns out to be the solution because  $f(D_{\text{part}}^{\text{aug}}|D_{\text{part}}; \theta)$  is actually free of  $\Lambda_0$ , a consequence of the fact that Cox's partial likelihood is identical to the full likelihood of  $\beta$  based on the ranks alone. One therefore can carry out (3) by calculating or simulating with respect to  $f(D_{\text{part}}^{\text{aug}}|D_{\text{part}}; \beta = \beta_{\text{ob}})$ , where  $\beta_{\text{ob}}$  is the Cox regression estimator based on  $D_{\text{part}}$ .

When there is censoring, the picture becomes less clear, because it is then possible for  $f(D_{\text{part}}^{\text{aug}}|D_{\text{part}}; \theta)$  to depend on the baseline  $\Lambda_0$ . This is not a contradiction to the celebrated feature of Cox's partial likelihood, that is, its robustness to the specification of  $\Lambda_0$ . The relative information  $\mathcal{R}I_1$  itself may well depend on the actual distribution of the failure time when there is censoring, because the probability of censoring generally depends on the actual distribution of the failure time. What this means is that whereas we can still define  $\mathcal{R}I_1$  theoretically as we did, it cannot be estimated using  $D_{\text{part}}$  alone. This dilemma could be taken as a defense for using (4), at least for practical purposes, especially considering the difficulties in implementing (3) even if  $\theta$  is known.

However, to avoid the type of "surprising findings" that Doss found, we would resolve this dilemma by

nonetheless using (3) but with the nuisance parameter  $\Lambda_0$  estimated from  $D_{\text{cens}}$ , for instance using the Nelson–Aalen estimator used by Doss. That is,  $D_{\text{cens}}$  enters the calculation only through the estimation of  $\Lambda_0$ . This dependence on  $D_{\text{cens}}$  will not cause the type of problems that Doss reported, because it does not alter the conditioning as called for by (3) and because our (18) permits its numerator and denominator to depend on different parts of the same  $\theta_{\text{ob}}$ . Of course, this dependence makes uncertainty quantifications, such as those emphasized by Zheng and Lo, even more important, as well as more complicated, because  $\Lambda_0$  is an infinite-dimensional nuisance parameter.

In a nutshell, all these complications remind us of the great caution we must exercise once we deviate from the full-likelihood setting. Indeed, whereas we recognized early the existence of an alternative explanation of Doss’s finding, one of our initial explanations itself was a product of our lacking full appreciation of the theoretical intricacy of Cox’s partial likelihood. We are certainly grateful to Doss for providing such a rich and intricate example, even though, or perhaps especially because, we were nearly tripped up by it!

We also very much appreciate Doss’s attempt to generalize our measure to the nonlikelihood setting. Indeed, our motivating examples, both the toy example with the binomial distribution and the real genetic applications, are for nonlikelihood types of testing, either with a Wald-type test in the binomial case or with nonparametric lod scores in the genetic setting. However, precisely for the “non-self-efficient” reason discussed above, it soon became clear to us that in order to avoid paradoxical situations where fewer data may lead to more information, we need to associate a test with a model in order to proceed, as we did in Section 2.3.

If we understand Doss’s notation correctly, his  $\mathcal{R}I_w$  can be obtained from our  $\mathcal{R}I_1$  by first associating his tests with normal models, and hence the likelihood ratio test is the same as the Wald test. It is easy to verify that once we associate the complete-data test with the normal model (i.e., pretending the large-sample approximation is exact), the denominator of  $\mathcal{R}I_1$  is the same as the denominator of Doss’s  $\mathcal{R}I_w$  as given in his (5). If we further associate the observed-data test with the normal model, then the numerators of  $\mathcal{R}I_1$  and  $\mathcal{R}I_w$  will be the same, and hence  $\mathcal{R}I_w$  will be identical to  $\mathcal{R}I_1$ .

An astute reader might question why we need to associate the normal model with the complete-data test and observed-data test separately. Should not the complete-data model automatically imply the

observed-data model? The answer is “yes” if both the complete-data test and the observed-data test are derived from a coherent probability model (e.g., if both are likelihood ratio tests). However, when tests are derived nonparametrically, or even parametrically but without following the full-likelihood recipe (for instance, using a partial likelihood), there is no guarantee that the two tests are “coherent” with each other in the sense that by integrating out the missing values in the complete-data associated model one would automatically obtain the observed-data associated model. Indeed, Doss’s  $\mathcal{R}I_w$  can also exceed 1 if the variance of the complete-data test statistic is larger than that of the observed-data test statistic, a phenomenon that can occur with an ordinary least square estimator, as discussed above. A logical conclusion is then that even when  $\mathcal{R}I_w$  seems to be “likelihood free,” fundamentally its rationality is guaranteed only when a (normal) likelihood family can be associated with it.

#### 4. C<sub>3</sub>H: INFECTIOUS DISEASE STUDIES AND ISOTONIC REGRESSION

We are pleased to see that C<sub>3</sub>H took on the task of implementing our suggested Bayesian measures in the context of infectious disease and regression. For infectious disease, C<sub>3</sub>H’s goal was to decide whether to invest in finding out the infectious times for the existing cases for which only the removal times are known, or in finding additional families/individuals whose removal times are known (but whose infectious times are unknown). This consideration is important here because identifying the infection time is typically much harder (if possible at all) than identifying the removal time (e.g., death time). For the isotonic regression application, C<sub>3</sub>H considered the design issue: whether to add more measurements at the existing design points or to add new design points that interlace with the existing design points.

While we are excited by these new applications, we are somewhat puzzled, and worried, by C<sub>3</sub>H’s findings in both examples. For the infectious disease example, our intuition would suggest that identifying infection times would be more important for testing efficacy of vaccine than finding more individuals with only removal times known, especially when it is not clear (at least to us from the model description given by C<sub>3</sub>H) whether “removal” here means death or cure (and thus possible immunity). C<sub>3</sub>H gave an example where the measured relative information in 20 households with only removal times is about 80% compared with the

situation in which everyone's infection time is also known. But it is only about 30% relative information compared with having four additional households with removal times only. This sharp difference is a surprise to us, and makes us wonder whether it is a reflection of issues with  $C_3H$ 's (BI3) or a defect in implementation (e.g., failure of an MC algorithm).

Similarly, we are surprised to see that, in the context of testing for monotonicity of a regression function, doubling the measurements at existing design points creates substantially more information than adding an equal amount of new design points interlaced with existing design points.  $C_3H$  gave an example where the observed data only have about 15% information relative to the former design, compared with 35% information relative to the latter design. This is rather counterintuitive, because for estimating a response surface with a fixed number of measurements, it is often wise to spread out more design points rather than to take more measurements on fewer design points. For example, for the simple linear regression  $y_i = \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i$  (the one that generated  $C_3H$ 's data), the variance of the least-square estimator would be inversely proportional to  $S_x = \sum_i x_i^2$ ; for  $C_3H$ 's setting,  $S_x = \sum_{i=0}^9 (i/9)^2 = 95/27$ . Doubling the number of measurements at each existing design point clearly will double  $S_x$ :  $S_x = 190/27 = 7.037$ . On the other hand,  $C_3H$ 's second design, if we understand their description correctly, is to use  $i/12$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 5, 7, \dots, 11$ , as the additional 10 design points. Under this design,  $S_x = \sum_{i=0}^9 (i/9)^2 + \sum_{i=1}^{11} (i/12)^2 - (6/12)^2 = 1465/216 = 6.78$ . So while the first design is indeed slightly better, the relative variance ratio is 96%, nowhere near the 2.5-fold increase in information suggested by  $C_3H$ 's results ( $0.346/0.139 = 2.5$ ). Of course, we understand that  $C_3H$  are measuring information in testing, not estimation, and their method is far more sophisticated than the simple linear regression. Nevertheless, we find the 2.5-fold increase rather counterintuitive, and would be very interested in seeing it confirmed independently in a different way.

$C_3H$  also touch on the intricate issue of dealing with nuisance parameters under the null. They suggest two ways of averaging: either averaging the numerator and denominator separately and then taking the ratio (BI3), or directly averaging the ratio (BI4). Here all averaging is performed with respect to the posterior distribution of the nuisance parameter under the null. As we discussed in Section 6.3 (and elsewhere) of our paper, dealing with nuisance parameters is a complicated issue, even with the Bayesian approach, because we

do not have reliable priors for them, nor do we know enough about the sensitivity of these measures, including  $C_3H$ 's, to the choice of priors. Therefore, understanding the theoretical properties of  $C_3H$ 's (BI3) and (BI4) could be an important step toward establishing a general scheme for dealing with nuisance parameters in the context of measuring the fraction of missing information.

## 5. POSSIBLE THESIS TOPICS

As we concluded in our paper, much remains to be done, especially with small sample sizes. The three discussions vividly demonstrate this, and point clearly to a number of concrete research directions. Here are a few possible thesis titles inspired by the discussions:

- *On Optimal Follow-up Designs in Genetic Hypothesis Testing Problems.*
- *Measuring Uncertainty in Relative Information Estimation.*
- *On Measuring Relative Information for Semiparametric Models.*
- *Measures of Information for Artificial Likelihoods.*
- *Implementing Bayesian Relative Information Measures for Designing Infectious Disease Studies.*
- *Optimal Design Strategies for Testing Regression Functions Under Constraints.*
- *Dealing with Nuisance Parameters in Measuring the Fraction of Missing Information.*

Some of these topics are middle-hanging fruits waiting to be picked, so if you are a thesis-topic seeking student reading this set of discussions in the reverse order, go to the first page as soon as possible!

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