Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation 

      Lahaie, Sébastien M.; Parkes, David C. (Association for Computing Machinery, 2004)
      We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that learning algorithms can be used as a basis ...
    • Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions for General Valuations 

      Mishra, Debasis; Parkes, David C. (Elsevier, 2007)
      Ascending price auctions involving a single price path and buyers paying their final bid price cannot achieve the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) outcome in the combinatorial auctions setting. Using a notion called universal ...
    • Strong Activity Rules for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions 

      Harsha, Pavithra; Barnhart, Cynthia; Parkes, David C.; Zhang, Haoqi (Elsevier, 2010)
      Activity rules have emerged in recent years as an important aspect of practical auction design. The role of an activity rule in an iterative auction is to suppress strategic behavior by bidders and promote simple, continual, ...