Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection 

      Imhof, Lorens A.; Fudenberg, Drew; Nowak, Martin A. (National Academy of Sciences, 2005)
      The main obstacle for the evolution of cooperation is that natural selection favors defection in most settings. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, two individuals interact several times, and, in each round, they have a ...
    • The One-Third Law of Evolutionary Dynamics 

      Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Bordalo, Pedro; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2007)
      Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provide a new framework for studying selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a “one-third law” of evolutionary dynamics has been described, which ...
    • Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics of Direct Reciprocity 

      Imhof, Lorens A.; Nowak, Martin A. (Royal Society, The, 2010)
      Evolutionary game theory is the study of frequency-dependent selection. The success of an individual depends on the frequencies of strategies that are used in the population. We propose a new model for studying evolutionary ...
    • Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift? 

      Imhof, Lorens; Fudenberg, Drew; Nowak, Martin (Elsevier, 2007)
      The repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is usually known as a story of tit-for-tat (TFT). This remarkable strategy has won both of Robert Axelrod's tournaments. TFT does whatever the opponent has done in the previous round. It ...