Now showing items 1-7 of 7

    • Exploration Dynamics in Evolutionary Games 

      Traulsen, Arne; Hauert, Christoph; De Silva, Hannelore; Nowak, Martin A.; Sigmund, Karl (National Academy of Sciences, 2009)
      Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with others. We consider a system in which players unconditionally imitate more successful strategies but sometimes also explore ...
    • The Fastest Evolutionary Trajectory 

      Traulsen, Arne; Iwasa, Yoh; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2007)
      Given two mutants, A and B, separated by n mutational steps, what is the evolutionary trajectory which allows a homogeneous population of A to reach B in the shortest time? We show that the optimum evolutionary trajectory ...
    • Mutation-Selection Equilibrium in Games with Multiple Strategies 

      Antal, Tibor; Traulsen, Arne; Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Tarnita, Corina Elena; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2009)
      In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but ...
    • The Pace of Evolution Across Fitness Valleys 

      Gokhale, Chaitanya S.; Iwasa, Yoh; Nowak, Martin A.; Traulsen, Arne (Elsevier, 2009)
      How fast does a population evolve from one fitness peak to another? We study the dynamics of evolving, asexually reproducing populations in which a certain number of mutations jointly confer a fitness advantage. We consider ...
    • Pairwise Comparison and Selection Temperature in Evolutionary Game Dynamics 

      Traulsen, Arne; Pacheco, Jorge M.; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2007)
      Recently, the frequency-dependent Moran process has been introduced in order to describe evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. Here, an alternative to this process is investigated that is based on pairwise ...
    • Strategy Abundance in 2×2 Games for Arbitrary Mutation Rates 

      Antal, Tibor; Nowak, Martin A.; Traulsen, Arne (Elsevier, 2009)
      We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of ...
    • A Symmetry of Fixation Times in Evoultionary Dynamics 

      Taylor, Christine Jiayou; Iwasa, Yoh; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2006)
      In this paper, we show that for evolutionary dynamics between two types that can be described by a Moran process, the conditional fixation time of either type is the same irrespective of the selective scenario. With frequency ...