DISTROY: Detecting Integrated Circuit Trojans with Compressive Measurements

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DISTROY: Detecting Integrated Circuit Trojans with Compressive Measurements

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dc.contributor.author Vlah, Dario
dc.contributor.author Kung, H.T. T.
dc.contributor.author Gwon, Youngjune Lee
dc.date.accessioned 2012-12-05T21:09:33Z
dc.date.issued 2012-12-05
dc.identifier.citation Gwon, Youngjune, H.T. Kung, and Dario Vlah. 2011. DISTROY: Detecting integrated circuit Trojans with compressive measurements. Paper presented at 6th USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security (HotSec 2011), San Francisco, CA, August 9, 2011. en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10000798
dc.description.abstract Detecting Trojans in an integrated circuit (IC) is an important but hard problem. A Trojan is malicious hardware it can be extremely small in size and dormant until triggered by some unknown circuit state. To allow wake-up, a Trojan could draw a minimal amount of power, for example, to run a clock or a state machine, or to monitor a triggering event. We introduce DISTROY (Discover Trojan), a new approach that can effciently and reliably detect extremely small background power leakage that a Trojan creates and as a result, we can detect the Trojan. We formulate our method based on compressive sensing, a recent advance in signal processing, which can recover a signal using the number of measurements approximately proportional to its sparsity rather than size. We argue that circuit states in which the Trojan background power consumption stands out are rare, and thus sparse, so that we can apply compressive sensing. We describe how this is done in DISTROY so as to afford suffcient measurement statistics to detect the presence of Trojans. Finally, we present our initial simulation results that validate DISTROY and discuss the impact of our work in the field of hardware security. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Engineering and Applied Sciences en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.relation.hasversion http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~htk/publication/2011-hotsec-gwon-kung-vlah.pdf en_US
dash.license LAA
dc.title DISTROY: Detecting Integrated Circuit Trojans with Compressive Measurements en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.description.version Author's Original en_US
dc.relation.journal 6th USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security (HotSec 2011) en_US
dash.depositing.author Kung, H.T. T.
dc.date.available 2012-12-05T21:09:33Z

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [6463]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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