DISTROY: Detecting Integrated Circuit Trojans with Compressive Measurements

DISTROY: Detecting Integrated Circuit Trojans with Compressive Measurements

DSpace/Manakin Repository

DISTROY: Detecting Integrated Circuit Trojans with Compressive Measurements

dc.contributor.author	Vlah, Dario
dc.contributor.author	Kung, H.T. T.
dc.contributor.author	Gwon, Youngjune Lee
dc.date.accessioned	2012-12-05T21:09:33Z
dc.date.issued	2012-12-05
dc.identifier.citation	Gwon, Youngjune, H.T. Kung, and Dario Vlah. 2011. DISTROY: Detecting integrated circuit Trojans with compressive measurements. Paper presented at 6th USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security (HotSec 2011), San Francisco, CA, August 9, 2011.	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10000798
dc.description.abstract	Detecting Trojans in an integrated circuit (IC) is an important but hard problem. A Trojan is malicious hardware it can be extremely small in size and dormant until triggered by some unknown circuit state. To allow wake-up, a Trojan could draw a minimal amount of power, for example, to run a clock or a state machine, or to monitor a triggering event. We introduce DISTROY (Discover Trojan), a new approach that can effciently and reliably detect extremely small background power leakage that a Trojan creates and as a result, we can detect the Trojan. We formulate our method based on compressive sensing, a recent advance in signal processing, which can recover a signal using the number of measurements approximately proportional to its sparsity rather than size. We argue that circuit states in which the Trojan background power consumption stands out are rare, and thus sparse, so that we can apply compressive sensing. We describe how this is done in DISTROY so as to afford suffcient measurement statistics to detect the presence of Trojans. Finally, we present our initial simulation results that validate DISTROY and discuss the impact of our work in the field of hardware security.	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Engineering and Applied Sciences	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.relation.hasversion	http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~htk/publication/2011-hotsec-gwon-kung-vlah.pdf	en_US
dash.license	LAA
dc.title	DISTROY: Detecting Integrated Circuit Trojans with Compressive Measurements	en_US
dc.type	Conference Paper	en_US
dc.description.version	Author's Original	en_US
dc.relation.journal	6th USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security (HotSec 2011)	en_US
dash.depositing.author	Kung, H.T. T.
dc.date.available	2012-12-05T21:09:33Z