Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorWeinzierl, Matthew Charles
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-13T14:38:52Z
dc.date.issued2014-01-13
dc.identifier.citationWeinzierl, Matthew. "The Promise of Positive Optimal Taxation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 14-013, August 2013.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11508221
dc.description.abstractAt the heart of modern optimal tax research is the assumption that the objective of taxation is Utilitarian. I present new survey evidence that most people disagree with this assumption, preferring tax policies based at least in part on a classic alternative objective: the principle of Equal Sacrifice. I generalize the standard model to accommodate this preference for a mixed objective, proposing a method by which to make disparate criteria commensurable while respecting Pareto efficiency. Then, I show that optimal policy in this generalized model, calibrated to the survey evidence and U.S. microdata, quantitatively matches several features of existing tax policy that are incompatible in the conventional model but widely endorsed in reality, including the coexistence of substantial redistribution and limited tagging. Together, these findings demonstrate the potential of a positive theory of optimal taxation.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.titleThe Promise of Positive Optimal Taxationen_US
dc.typeResearch Paper or Reporten_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalHarvard Business School working paper series # 14-013en_US
dash.depositing.authorWeinzierl, Matthew Charles
dc.date.available2014-01-13T14:38:52Z
dash.contributor.affiliatedWeinzierl, Matthew


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record