There Can Be No Turing-Test--Passing Memorizing Machines

DSpace/Manakin Repository

There Can Be No Turing-Test--Passing Memorizing Machines

Citable link to this page

. . . . . .

Title: There Can Be No Turing-Test--Passing Memorizing Machines
Author: Shieber, Stuart M.
Citation: Shieber, Stuart M. 2014. There can be no Turing-Test--passing memorizing machines. Philosophers' Imprint 14(16): 1-13.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: Anti-behaviorist arguments against the validity of the Turing Test as a sufficient condition for attributing intelligence are based on a memorizing machine, which has recorded within it responses to every possible Turing Test interaction of up to a fixed length. The mere possibility of such a machine is claimed to be enough to invalidate the Turing Test. I consider the nomological possibility of memorizing machines, and how long a Turing Test they can pass. I replicate my previous analysis of this critical Turing Test length based on the age of the universe, show how considerations of communication time shorten that estimate and allow eliminating the sole remaining contingent assumption, and argue that the bound is so short that it is incompatible with the very notion of the Turing Test. I conclude that the memorizing machine objection to the Turing Test as a sufficient condition for attributing intelligence is invalid.
Published Version: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0014.016
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11684156

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7362]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters