Approximate Strategyproofness
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Benjamin Lubin and David C. Parkes. 2012. Approximate strategyproofness. Current Science 103, no. 9: 1021-1032.Abstract
The standard approach of mechanism design theory insists on equilibrium behavior by participants. This assumption is captured by imposing incentive constraints on the design space. But in bridging from theory to practice, it often becomes necessary to relax incentive constraints in order to allow tradeoffs with other desirable properties. This article surveys a number of different options that can be adopted in relaxing incentive constraints, providing a current view of the state-of-the-art.Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAPCitable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11879945
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