Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Direct Reciprocity on Graphs 

      Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2007)
      Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on the idea of repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here we examine direct reciprocity in structured populations, where individuals ...
    • Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations 

      Nowak, Martin A.; Tarnita, Corina E.; Antal, Tibor (The Royal Society, 2010)
      Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals ...
    • Evolutionary Games on Cycles 

      Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Nowak, Martin A. (Royal Society, The, 2006)
      Traditional evolutionary game theory explores frequency-dependent selection in well-mixed populations without spatial or stochastic effects. But recently there has been much interest in studying the evolutionary game ...
    • Evolutionary Stability on Graphs 

      Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2008)
      Evolutionary stability is a fundamental concept in evolutionary game theory. A strategy is called an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), if its monomorphic population rejects the invasion of any other mutant strategy. ...
    • The Replicator Equation on Graphs 

      Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Nowak, Martin A. (Elsevier, 2006)
      We study evolutionary games on graphs. Each player is represented by a vertex of the graph. The edges denote who meets whom. A player can use any one of n strategies. Players obtain a payoff from interaction with all their ...