Kidney Exchange

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Kidney Exchange

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dc.contributor.author Roth, Alvin
dc.contributor.author Ünver, M. Utku
dc.contributor.author Sönmez, Tayfun
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-11T20:06:06Z
dc.date.issued 2004
dc.identifier.citation Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver. 2004. Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2): 457-488. en
dc.identifier.issn 0033-5533 en
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:2580565
dc.description.abstract Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also many transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. Exchanges are also made in which a donor-patient pair makes a donation to someone waiting for a cadaver kidney, in return for the patient in the pair receiving high priority for a compatible cadaver kidney when one becomes available. There are stringent legal/ethical constraints on how exchanges can be conducted. We explore how larger scale exchanges of these kinds can be arranged efficiently and incentive compatibly, within existing constraints. The problem resembles some of the “housing” problems studied in the mechanism design literature for indivisible goods, with the novel feature that while live donor kidneys can be assigned simultaneously, cadaver kidneys cannot. In addition to studying the theoretical properties of the proposed kidney exchange, we present simulation results suggesting that the welfare gains from larger scale exchange would be substantial, both in increased number of feasible live donation transplants, and in improved match quality of transplanted kidneys. en
dc.description.sponsorship Economics en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher MIT Press en
dc.relation.isversionof http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0033553041382157 en
dash.license LAA
dc.title Kidney Exchange en
dc.relation.journal Quarterly Journal of Economics en
dash.depositing.author Roth, Alvin

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7106]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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