Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.014Metadata
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Fudenberg, Drew, Markus M. Mobius, and Adam Szeidl. 2007. Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions. Journal of Economic Theory 133(1): 550-567.Abstract
We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in dou-ble auction markets with correlated, conditionally independent private values and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets.
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