From Neural 'Is' to Moral 'Ought': What are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?

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From Neural 'Is' to Moral 'Ought': What are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?

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Title: From Neural 'Is' to Moral 'Ought': What are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?
Author: Greene, Joshua D.
Citation: Greene, Joshua D. 2003. From neural 'is' to moral 'ought': What are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology? Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4(10): 846-850.
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Abstract: Many moral philosophers regard scientific research as irrelevant to their work because science deals with what is the case, whereas ethics deals with what ought to be. Some ethicists question this is/ought distinction, arguing that science and normative ethics are continuous and that ethics might someday be regarded as a natural social science. I agree with traditional ethicists that there is a sharp and crucial distinction between the 'is' of science and the 'ought' of ethics, but maintain nonetheless that science, and neuroscience in particular, can have profound ethical implications by providing us with information that will prompt us to re-evaluate our moral values and our conceptions of morality.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn1224
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3124125

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [6463]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

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