The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference

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The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference

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Title: The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference
Author: Siegel, Susanna
Citation: Siegel, Susanna. 2002. The role of perception in demonstrative reference. Philosophers' Imprint 2, no. 1: 1-21.
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Abstract: Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
Published Version: http://www.philosophersimprint.org/
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3153302

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7470]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

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