dc.contributor.author | Moran, Richard | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-09T13:54:53Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1994 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Moran, Richard. 1994. Interpretation theory and the first person. Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 175: 154-173. | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0031-8094 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3157885 | |
dc.description.abstract | Discusses the rationalizing view of psychological discourse and the requirements of common sense psychology, specifically that of accommodating both first- and third-person ascriptions of mental states. Intentional psychology as a theory; Self-ascription and univocality; Interpretation theory and the first person; Saving the asymmetries; Rationality and the two perspectives of intentional psychology. | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | Philosophy | en |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.publisher | Blackwell Publishing | en |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219738 | en |
dc.relation.hasversion | http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~moran/writings.html | en |
dash.license | LAA | |
dc.title | Interpretation Theory and the First Person | en |
dc.relation.journal | Philosophical Quarterly | en |
dash.depositing.author | Moran, Richard | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2307/2219738 | * |
dash.contributor.affiliated | Moran, Richard | |