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dc.contributor.authorMoran, Richard
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-09T13:54:53Z
dc.date.issued1994
dc.identifier.citationMoran, Richard. 1994. Interpretation theory and the first person. Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 175: 154-173.en
dc.identifier.issn0031-8094en
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3157885
dc.description.abstractDiscusses the rationalizing view of psychological discourse and the requirements of common sense psychology, specifically that of accommodating both first- and third-person ascriptions of mental states. Intentional psychology as a theory; Self-ascription and univocality; Interpretation theory and the first person; Saving the asymmetries; Rationality and the two perspectives of intentional psychology.en
dc.description.sponsorshipPhilosophyen
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishingen
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219738en
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~moran/writings.htmlen
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleInterpretation Theory and the First Personen
dc.relation.journalPhilosophical Quarterlyen
dash.depositing.authorMoran, Richard
dc.identifier.doi10.2307/2219738*
dash.contributor.affiliatedMoran, Richard


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