Naive Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy Debates

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Naive Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy Debates

Show simple item record Hanson, Jon Benforado, Adam 2009-07-13T20:47:48Z 2008
dc.identifier.citation Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naive Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy Debates, 57 Emory L.J. 499 (2008). en
dc.identifier.issn 0094-4076 en
dc.description.abstract This is the second article in a multi-part series. In the first part, The Great Attributional Divide, the authors suggested that a major rift runs across many of our major policy debates based on contrasting attributional tendencies (dispositionist and situationist). This article explores how dispositionism maintains its dominance despite the fact that it misses so much of what actually moves us. It argues that the answer lies in a subordinate dynamic and discourse, naïve cynicism: the basic subconscious mechanism by which dispositionists discredit and dismiss situationist insights and their proponents. Without it, the dominant person schema - dispositionism - would be far more vulnerable to challenge and change, and the more accurate person schema - situationism - less easily and effectively attacked. Naïve cynicism is thus critically important to explaining how and why certain legal policies manage to carry the day. en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.relation.isversionof en
dc.relation.hasversion en
dash.license META_ONLY
dc.subject Abu Ghraib en
dc.subject naive realism en
dc.subject realism en
dc.subject situationism en
dc.subject psychology en
dc.subject ideology en
dc.subject legal theory en
dc.subject law en
dc.title Naive Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy Debates en
dc.relation.journal Emory Law Journal en
dash.embargo.until 10000-01-01

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