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dc.contributor.authorEllison, Glenn
dc.contributor.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.authorImhof, Lorens
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-15T13:31:15Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.citationEllison, Glenn, Drew Fudenberg, and Lorens A. Imhof. 2009. Random matching in adaptive dynamics. Games and Economic Behavior 66, no. 1: 98-114.en
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256en
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3190371
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the effect of randomness in per-period matching on the long-run outcome of non-equilibrium adaptive processes. If there are many matchings between each strategy revision, the randomness due to matching will be small; our question is when a very small noise due to matching has a negligible effect. We study two different senses of this idea, and provide sufficient conditions for each. The less demanding sense corresponds to sending the matching noise to zero while holding fixed all other aspects of the adaptive process. The second sense in which matching noise can be negligible is that it does not alter the <i>limit distribution</i> obtained as the limit of the invariant distributions as an exogenous “mutation rate” goes to zero.en
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.010en
dash.licenseLAA
dc.subjectMarkov chainen
dc.subjectlimit distributionen
dc.subjectinvariant distributionen
dc.subjectstochastic matching processen
dc.subjectrepeated matchingen
dc.subjectimitation processen
dc.subjectequilibrium selectionen
dc.titleRandom Matching in Adaptive Dynamicsen
dc.relation.journalGames and Economic Behavioren
dash.depositing.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.010*
dash.contributor.affiliatedFudenberg, Drew


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