Superstition and Rational Learning
| Title: | Superstition and Rational Learning |
| Author: |
Levine, David; Fudenberg, Drew
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2006. Superstition and rational learning. American Economic Review 96, no. 3: 630-651. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
Superstition.pdf (344.7Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | We argue that some, but not all, superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the Code of Hammurabi. The code specified an “appeal by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. According to our theory, a mechanism that uses superstitions two or more steps off the equilibrium path, such as “appeal by surviving in the river,” is more likely to persist than a superstition where the false beliefs are only one step off the equilibrium path. |
| Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.630 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3196330 |
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Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
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