Rules of Thumb for Social Learning
| Title: | Rules of Thumb for Social Learning |
| Author: |
Ellison, Glenn; Fudenberg, Drew
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Ellison, Glenn, and Drew Fudenberg. 1993. Rules of thumb for social learning. Journal of Political Economy 101, no. 4: 612-643. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
fudenberg_rules.pdf (1.581Mb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | This paper studies agents who consider the experiences of their neighbors in deciding which of two technologies to use. We analyze two learning environments, one in which the same technology is optimal for all players and another in which each technology is better for some of them. In both environments, players use exogenously specified rules of thumb that ignore historical data but may incorporate a tendency to use the more popular technology. In some cases these naive rules can lead to fairly efficient decisions in the long run, but adjustment can be slow when a superior technology is first introduced. |
| Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261890 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3196332 |
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Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
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