Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations

Citable link to this page


Title: Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations
Author: Imhof, Lorens; Fudenberg, Drew

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Fudenberg, Drew, and Lorens A. Imhof. 2008. Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations. Journal of Economic Theory 140, no. 1: 229-245.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any finite number of actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes small and the population becomes large. Our results cover the multiple-action extensions of the aspiration-and-imitation process of Binmore and Samuelson [Muddling through: noisy equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 74 (1997) 235–265] and the related processes proposed by Benaı¨m and Weibull [Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games, Econometrica 71 (2003) 873–903] and Traulsen et al. [Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populations, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 (2005) 238701], as well as the frequency-dependent Moran process studied by Fudenberg et al. [Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation, Theoretical Population Biol. 70 (2006) 352–363]. We illustrate our results by considering the effect of the number of periods of repetition on the selected equilibrium in repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma when players are restricted to a small set of simple strategies.
Published Version:
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
Citable link to this page:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)


Search DASH

Advanced Search