Wage-Employment Contracts

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Wage-Employment Contracts

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dc.contributor.author Kahn, Charles M.
dc.contributor.author Green, Jerry
dc.date.accessioned 2009-08-04T20:03:43Z
dc.date.issued 1983
dc.identifier.citation Green, Jerry and Charles M. Kahn. 1983. Wage-employment contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, no. 3, Suppl.: 173-187. en
dc.identifier.issn 1531-4650 en
dc.identifier.issn 0033-5533 en
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203642
dc.description.abstract This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. The firms' superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk. It is shown that, if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk-neutral, employment is <i>always above</i> the efficient level. Such a one-period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk-neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information. en
dc.description.sponsorship Economics en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher MIT Press en
dc.relation.isversionof http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1885379 en
dash.license LAA
dc.title Wage-Employment Contracts en
dc.relation.journal Quarterly Journal of Economics en
dash.depositing.author Green, Jerry

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7175]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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