The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games

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The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games

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Title: The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games
Author: Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2007. The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games. Journal of Economic Theory 132, no. 1: 461-473.
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Abstract: We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to the n-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these “third parties” to effectively enforce contracts.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.006
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203772

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [6948]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

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