The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games
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The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games
| Title: | The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games |
| Author: |
Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2007. The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games. Journal of Economic Theory 132, no. 1: 461-473. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
fudenberg_nash.pdf (369.7Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to the n-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these “third parties” to effectively enforce contracts. |
| Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.006 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203772 |
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FAS Scholarly Articles [5128]
Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
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