The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games

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The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games

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dc.contributor.author Fudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.author Levine, David
dc.date.accessioned 2009-08-05T19:20:22Z
dc.date.issued 2007
dc.identifier.citation Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2007. The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games. Journal of Economic Theory 132, no. 1: 461-473. en
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531 en
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203772
dc.description.abstract We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to the <i>n</i>-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these “third parties” to effectively enforce contracts. en
dc.description.sponsorship Economics en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Elsevier en
dc.relation.isversionof http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.006 en
dash.license LAA
dc.subject repeated games en
dc.subject communication en
dc.subject private monitoring en
dc.subject folk theorem en
dc.title The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games en
dc.relation.journal Journal of Economic Theory en
dash.depositing.author Fudenberg, Drew

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7106]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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