The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games

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dc.contributor.author	Fudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.author	Levine, David
dc.date.accessioned	2009-08-05T19:20:22Z
dc.date.issued	2007
dc.identifier.citation	Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2007. The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games. Journal of Economic Theory 132, no. 1: 461-473.	en
dc.identifier.issn	0022-0531	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203772
dc.description.abstract	We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to the <i>n</i>-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these “third parties” to effectively enforce contracts.	en
dc.description.sponsorship	Economics	en
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dc.publisher	Elsevier	en
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.006	en
dash.license	LAA
dc.subject	repeated games	en
dc.subject	communication	en
dc.subject	private monitoring	en
dc.subject	folk theorem	en
dc.title	The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games	en
dc.relation.journal	Journal of Economic Theory	en
dash.depositing.author	Fudenberg, Drew

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