When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
| Title: | When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? |
| Author: |
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Levine, David; Fudenberg, Drew
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Fudenberg, Drew, David K. Levine, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 1998. When are nonanonymous players negligible?. Journal of Economic Theory 79, no. 1: 46-71. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
fudenberg_nonanonymous.PDF (140.7Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set converges to that of the game where there is a continuum of small players. This paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by dropping the assumption that small players' actions are “anonymous.” That is, we allow each small player's actions to be observed separately, instead of supposing that the small players' actions are only observed through their effect on an aggregate statistic. |
| Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2373 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203775 |
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