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dc.contributor.author	Ambrus, Attila
dc.contributor.author	Argenziano, Rossella
dc.date.accessioned	2009-08-07T14:39:13Z
dc.date.issued	2009
dc.identifier.citation	Ambrus, Attila, and Rossella Argenziano. 2009. Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1(1): 17-52.	en
dc.identifier.issn	1945-7669	en
dc.identifier.issn	1945-7685	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3204916
dc.description.abstract	This paper investigates pricing decisions and network choices in two-sided markets with network externalities. Consumers are heterogeneous in how much they value the externality. Imposing restrictions on the extent of coordination failure among consumers generates clear qualitative conclusions about equilibrium market configurations. Multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium, both in the case of a monopolist network provider and in the case of competing providers. These equilibria have the property that one network is cheaper and larger on one side, while the other network is cheaper and larger on the other side. Product differentiation is endogenized by consumers' network choices.	en
dc.description.sponsorship	Economics	en
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dc.publisher	American Economic Association	en
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.1.1.17	en
dash.license	LAA
dc.title	Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets	en
dc.type	Journal Article
dc.description.version	Accepted Manuscript
dc.relation.journal	American Economic Journal: Microeconomics	en
dash.depositing.author	Ambrus, Attila

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  Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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