Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets

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Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets

Show simple item record Ambrus, Attila Argenziano, Rossella 2009-08-07T14:39:13Z 2009
dc.identifier.citation Ambrus, Attila, and Rossella Argenziano. 2009. Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1(1): 17-52. en
dc.identifier.issn 1945-7669 en
dc.identifier.issn 1945-7685 en
dc.description.abstract This paper investigates pricing decisions and network choices in two-sided markets with network externalities. Consumers are heterogeneous in how much they value the externality. Imposing restrictions on the extent of coordination failure among consumers generates clear qualitative conclusions about equilibrium market configurations. Multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium, both in the case of a monopolist network provider and in the case of competing providers. These equilibria have the property that one network is cheaper and larger on one side, while the other network is cheaper and larger on the other side. Product differentiation is endogenized by consumers' network choices. en
dc.description.sponsorship Economics en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher American Economic Association en
dc.relation.isversionof en
dash.license LAA
dc.title Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets en
dc.type Journal Article
dc.description.version Accepted Manuscript
dc.relation.journal American Economic Journal: Microeconomics en Ambrus, Attila

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