Theories of Coalitional Rationality
| Title: | Theories of Coalitional Rationality |
| Author: | Ambrus, Attila |
| Citation: | Ambrus, Attila. 2009. Theories of coalitional rationality. Journal of Economic Theory 144(2): 676-695. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
Ambrus_TheoriesCoalitional.pdf (328.4Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is consistent with rationality and common certainty that every coalition is rational. A characterization of this solution set is provided for operators satisfying four basic properties. Special attention is devoted to an operator that leads to a solution concept that is generically equivalent to the iteratively defined concept of coalitional rationalizability. |
| Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.010 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3204917 |
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