Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions

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Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions

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dc.contributor.author Lubin, Benjamin
dc.contributor.author Parkes, David
dc.date.accessioned 2009-08-20T14:05:25Z
dc.date.issued 2009
dc.identifier.citation Lubin, Benjamin and David C. Parkes. Forthcoming. Quantifying the strategyproofness of mechanisms via metrics on payoff distributions. In UAI-09: Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, June 18-21, 2009, Montreal, Canada. Corvallis, Or: AUAI Press for Association for Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence. en
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3220230
dc.description.abstract Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by coalitions, and computational tractability. In the search for maximally-strategyproof mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy other desirable properties, we introduce a new metric to quantify the strategyproofness of a mechanism, based on comparing the payoff distribution, given truthful reports, against that of a strategyproof “reference” mechanism that solves a problem relaxation. Focusing on combinatorial exchanges, we demonstrate that the metric is informative about the eventual equilibrium, where simple regret-based metrics are not, and can be used for online selection of an effective mechanism. en
dc.description.sponsorship Engineering and Applied Sciences en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher AUAI, CoRR, and ACM Digital Libraries en
dc.relation.isversionof http://www.auai.org/ en
dash.license OAP
dc.title Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions en
dash.depositing.author Parkes, David

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7594]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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