Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions
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| dc.contributor.author |
Lubin, Benjamin
|
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Parkes, David
|
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| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-08-20T14:05:25Z |
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| dc.date.issued |
2009 |
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| dc.identifier.citation |
Lubin, Benjamin and David C. Parkes. Forthcoming. Quantifying the strategyproofness of mechanisms via metrics on payoff distributions. In UAI-09: Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, June 18-21, 2009, Montreal, Canada. Corvallis, Or: AUAI Press for Association for Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence. |
en |
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3220230 |
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| dc.description.abstract |
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium
with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by coalitions, and computational tractability. In the search for maximally-strategyproof mechanisms
that simultaneously satisfy other desirable properties,
we introduce a new metric to quantify the strategyproofness of a mechanism, based on comparing the payoff distribution, given truthful reports, against that of a strategyproof “reference” mechanism that solves a problem relaxation.
Focusing on combinatorial exchanges, we demonstrate that the metric is informative about the eventual equilibrium, where simple regret-based metrics are not, and can be used for online selection of an effective mechanism. |
en |
| dc.description.sponsorship |
Engineering and Applied Sciences |
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| dc.language.iso |
en |
en |
| dc.publisher |
AUAI, CoRR, and ACM Digital Libraries |
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| dc.relation.isversionof |
http://www.auai.org/ |
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| dash.license |
OAP |
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| dc.title |
Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions |
en |
| dash.depositing.author |
Parkes, David
|
|
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FAS Scholarly Articles [5133]
Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
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