Political Competition in Weak States

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Political Competition in Weak States

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Title: Political Competition in Weak States
Author: La Ferrara, Eliana; Bates, Robert

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: La Ferrara, Eliana, and Robert H. Bates. 2001. Political competition in weak states. Economics & Politics 13(2): 159-184.
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Abstract: In the developing areas, politics is often undemocratic, states lack a monopoly over violence, and politicians play upon cultural identities. To analyze politics in such settings, we develop a model in which politicians compete to build a revenue yielding constituency. Citizens occupy fixed locations and politicians seek to maximize rents. To secure revenues, politicians must incur the costs of providing local public goods and mobilizing security services. Citizens must participate, i.e. pay taxes; but can choose which leader to support. The model enables us to explore the impact of cultural identities and varying notions of military power.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00088
Other Sources: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/068.htm
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3224415

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7219]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

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