Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas

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Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas

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Title: Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas
Author: Bianco, William; Bates, Robert

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Bianco, William T., and Robert H. Bates. 1990. Cooperation by design: leadership, structure, and collective dilemmas. American Political Science Review 84(1): 133-147.
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Abstract: We return to the analysis of cooperation among interdependent rational individuals. We emphasize the limited impact of iteration (or repeated play) and explore the possibility of an alternative: intervention by rational agents, whom we call leaders. We show that leadership is more significant for initiating cooperation than for sustaining it. In addition, we identify two features of organizations that are critical in determining a leader's ability to initiate and sustain cooperation by structuring the incentives of his followers: the leader's capabilities (information and strategy sets) and reward structure (payoff function).
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963633
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3224416

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7470]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

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