Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas

Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas

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Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas

dc.contributor.author	Bianco, William
dc.contributor.author	Bates, Robert
dc.date.accessioned	2009-08-25T17:46:34Z
dc.date.issued	1990
dc.identifier.citation	Bianco, William T., and Robert H. Bates. 1990. Cooperation by design: leadership, structure, and collective dilemmas. American Political Science Review 84(1): 133-147.	en
dc.identifier.issn	1537-5943	en
dc.identifier.issn	0003-0554	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3224416
dc.description.abstract	We return to the analysis of cooperation among interdependent rational individuals. We emphasize the limited impact of iteration (or repeated play) and explore the possibility of an alternative: intervention by rational agents, whom we call leaders. We show that leadership is more significant for initiating cooperation than for sustaining it. In addition, we identify two features of organizations that are critical in determining a leader's ability to initiate and sustain cooperation by structuring the incentives of his followers: the leader's capabilities (information and strategy sets) and reward structure (payoff function).	en
dc.description.sponsorship	African and African American Studies	en
dc.description.sponsorship	Government	en
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dc.publisher	Cambridge University Press	en
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963633	en
dash.license	LAA
dc.title	Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas	en
dc.relation.journal	American Political Science Review	en
dash.depositing.author	Bates, Robert