Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Boardroom Centrality and Firm Performance 

      Larcker, David F.; So, Eric C.; Wang, Changyi Chang-Yi (2013)
      Firms with central or well-connected boards of directors earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns. Initiating a long position in the most central firms and a short position in the least central firms earns an average ...
    • Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors 

      Li, Feng; Srinivasan, Suraj (Elsevier, 2011)
      We examine CEO compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms where founders serve as a director with a non-founder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix ...
    • Governance and CEO Turnover: Do Something or Do the Right Thing? 

      Fisman, Ray; Khurana, Rakesh; Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew; Yim, Soojin (INFORMS, 2014)
      We study how corporate governance affects firm value through the decision of whether to fire or retain the CEO. We present a model in which weak governance—which prevents shareholders from controlling the board—protects ...
    • How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment 

      Cohen, Alma; Wang, Changyi Chang-Yi (Elsevier, 2013)
      The well-established negative correlation between staggered boards (SBs) and firm value could be due to SBs leading to lower value or a reflection of low-value firms' greater propensity to maintain SBs. We analyze the ...
    • Reexamining staggered boards and shareholder value 

      Cohen, Alma; Wang, Changyi Chang-Yi (Elsevier BV, 2017)
      Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications ...