Eliminating Earmarks: Why the Congressional Line Item Vote Can Succeed Where the Presidential Line Item Veto Failed

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Eliminating Earmarks: Why the Congressional Line Item Vote Can Succeed Where the Presidential Line Item Veto Failed

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Title: Eliminating Earmarks: Why the Congressional Line Item Vote Can Succeed Where the Presidential Line Item Veto Failed
Author: Iuliano, Jason Nicholas
Citation: Jason Iuliano, Eliminating Earmarks: Why the Congressional Line Item Vote Can Succeed Where the Presidential Line Item Veto Failed, 112 West Virginia Law Review 947 (2010).
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Abstract: Congressional earmarking is an issue of growing concern in the United States. Although it currently accounts for a small percentage of federal expenditures, recent trends indicate that such pork-barrel spending will soon become a significant contributor to the national debt. The federal government must work to control this problem before it becomes unmanageable. One recent attempt to reduce the number of earmarks was the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. On both constitutional grounds and in practice, this measure failed. Instead of acknowledging these shortcomings and crafting innovative solutions, legislators have repeatedly introduced bills that would once again grant the president a form of line item veto power. This Article, however, develops an entirely new process - the congressional line item vote - that has the potential to eliminate earmarks, reduce the deficit, and make members of Congress more accountable to their constituents.
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3428428

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