Judicial Fact Discretion

Judicial Fact Discretion

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Judicial Fact Discretion

dc.contributor.author	Gennaioli, Nicola
dc.contributor.author	Shleifer, Andrei
dc.date.accessioned	2010-01-12T14:57:16Z
dc.date.issued	2008
dc.identifier.citation	Gennaioli, Nicola, and Andrei Shleifer. 2008. Judicial fact discretion. Journal of Legal Studies 37(1): 1-35.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0047-2530	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3451304
dc.description.abstract	Following legal realists, we model the causes and consequences of trial judges exercising discretion in finding facts in a trial. We identify two motivations for the exercise of such discretion: judicial policy preferences and judges’ aversion to reversal on appeal when the law is unsettled. In the latter case, judges exercising fact discretion find the facts that fit the settled precedents, even when they have no policy preferences. In a standard model of a tort, judicial fact discretion leads to setting of damages unpredictable from true facts of the case but predictable from knowledge of judicial preferences, distorts the number and severity of accidents, and generates welfare losses. It also encourages litigants to take extreme positions in court and raises the incidence of litigation relative to settlement, especially in new and complex disputes for which the law is unsettled.	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Economics	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	University of Chicago Press	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/588266	en_US
dc.relation.hasversion	http://ws1.ad.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/JFD_JLS_final.pdf
dash.license	META_ONLY
dc.title	Judicial Fact Discretion	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.description.version	Version of Record	en_US
dc.relation.journal	Journal of Legal Studies -Chicago-	en_US
dash.depositing.author	Shleifer, Andrei
dash.embargo.until	10000-01-01
dc.date.available	2010-01-12T14:57:16Z