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dc.contributor.author	Shleifer, Andrei
dc.contributor.author	Vishny, Robert W.
dc.date.accessioned	2010-02-01T15:18:57Z
dc.date.issued	1986
dc.identifier.citation	Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94(3): 461-488.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0022-3808	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3606237
dc.description.abstract	In a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up? How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of a diffusely held firm? Why do corporate and personal investors commonly hold stock in the same firm, despite their disparate tax preferences?	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Economics	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	University of Chicago Press	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261385	en_US
dc.relation.hasversion	http://ws1.ad.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/lg_shareholders.pdf	en_US
dash.license	META_ONLY
dc.title	Large Shareholders and Corporate Control	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.description.version	Version of Record	en_US
dc.relation.journal	Journal of Political Economy -Chicago-	en_US
dash.depositing.author	Shleifer, Andrei
dash.embargo.until	10000-01-01

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  Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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