Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

Show simple item record Shleifer, Andrei Vishny, Robert W. 2010-02-01T15:18:57Z 1986
dc.identifier.citation Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94(3): 461-488. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0022-3808 en_US
dc.description.abstract In a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up? How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of a diffusely held firm? Why do corporate and personal investors commonly hold stock in the same firm, despite their disparate tax preferences? en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Economics en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher University of Chicago Press en_US
dc.relation.isversionof en_US
dc.relation.hasversion en_US
dash.license META_ONLY
dc.title Large Shareholders and Corporate Control en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Version of Record en_US
dc.relation.journal Journal of Political Economy -Chicago- en_US Shleifer, Andrei
dash.embargo.until 10000-01-01

Files in this item

Files Size Format View
Shleifer_IndustralizationBigPush.pdf 2.297Mb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record


Search DASH

Advanced Search