Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle

Citable link to this page

. . . . . .

Title: Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle
Author: Dickens, William T.; Katz, Lawrence F.; Lang, Kevin; Summers, Lawrence H.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Dickens, William T., Lawrence F. Katz, Kevin Lang, and Lawrence H. Summers. 1989. Employee crime and the monitoring puzzle. Journal of Labor Economics 7(3): 331-347.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: The simplest economic theories of crime predict that profit-maximizing firms should follow strategies of minimal monitoring with large penalties for employee crime. We investigate possible reasons why firms actually spend considerable resources trying to detect employee malfeasance. We find that the most plausible explanations for firms' large outlays on monitoring of employees-legal restrictions on penalty clauses in contracts and the adverse impact of harsh punishment schemes on worker morale-are also consistent with the payment of premium (rent-generating) wages by cost-minimizing firms.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/298211
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3645199

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7470]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters