Organizing Violence

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Organizing Violence

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Title: Organizing Violence
Author: Singh, Smita; Greif, Avner; Bates, Robert

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Bates, Robert, Avner Greif, and Smita Singh. 2002. Organizing violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 5: 599-628.
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Abstract: In stateless societies, coercion is privately provided; violence is employed to engage in, and to defend against, predation. At best, violence results in mere redistribution; being destructive, it more often results in a loss of social welfare. When organized, however, violence can be socially productive; it can be employed to defend property rights, thereby strengthening the incentives to engage in productive activity. To explore how violence can be rendered a source of welfare, the authors develop a model of a stateless society in which people's rights to the product of their labor are secure only if they possess coercive capabilities. Using case materials and formal logic, the authors then compare this outcome with that obtained when private agents reward specialists in violence for defending property rights. In doing so, we plumb the role of the state.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200202236166
Other Sources: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/071.pdf
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3707095

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7588]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

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