Organizing Violence

Organizing Violence

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Organizing Violence

dc.contributor.author	Singh, Smita
dc.contributor.author	Greif, Avner
dc.contributor.author	Bates, Robert
dc.date.accessioned	2010-02-25T15:37:43Z
dc.date.issued	2002
dc.identifier.citation	Bates, Robert, Avner Greif, and Smita Singh. 2002. Organizing violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 5: 599-628.	en
dc.identifier.issn	0022-0027	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3707095
dc.description.abstract	In stateless societies, coercion is privately provided; violence is employed to engage in, and to defend against, predation. At best, violence results in mere redistribution; being destructive, it more often results in a loss of social welfare. When organized, however, violence can be socially productive; it can be employed to defend property rights, thereby strengthening the incentives to engage in productive activity. To explore how violence can be rendered a source of welfare, the authors develop a model of a stateless society in which people's rights to the product of their labor are secure only if they possess coercive capabilities. Using case materials and formal logic, the authors then compare this outcome with that obtained when private agents reward specialists in violence for defending property rights. In doing so, we plumb the role of the state.	en
dc.description.sponsorship	African and African American Studies	en
dc.description.sponsorship	Government	en
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dc.publisher	SAGE Publications	en
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200202236166	en
dc.relation.hasversion	http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/071.pdf	en
dash.license	LAA
dc.subject	political economy	en
dc.subject	coercion	en
dc.subject	game theory	en
dc.subject	political order	en
dc.subject	violence	en
dc.title	Organizing Violence	en
dc.relation.journal	Journal of Conflict Resolution	en
dash.depositing.author	Bates, Robert
dc.date.available	2010-02-25T15:37:43Z