Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem

Citable link to this page

. . . . . .

Title: Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem
Author: Holden, Richard T.; Fudenberg, Drew; Aghion, Philippe

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Aghion, Philippe, Drew Fudenberg, and Richard T. Holden. 2009. Subgame perfect implementation with almost perfect information and the hold-up problem. NBER Working Paper Series 15167.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore-Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility.
Published Version: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15167
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3708929

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • FAS Scholarly Articles [6463]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters