Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia

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Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia

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dc.contributor.author Stein, Jeremy C.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-01T21:02:50Z
dc.date.issued 1988
dc.identifier.citation Stein, Jeremy C. 1988. Takeover threats and managerial myopia. Journal of Political Economy 96(1): 61-80. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0022-3808 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3708937
dc.description.abstract This paper examines the familiar argument that takeover pressure can be damaging because it leads managers to sacrifice long-term interests in order to boost current profits. If stockholders are imperfectly informed, temporarily low earnings may cause the stock to become undervalued, increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price; hence the managerial concern with current bottom line. The magnitude of the problem depends on a variety of factors, including the attitudes and beliefs o f shareholders, the extent to which corporate raiders have inside information, and the degree to which managers are concerned with retaining control of their firms. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Economics en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher University of Chicago Press en_US
dc.relation.isversionof http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261524 en_US
dash.license LAA
dc.title Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Version of Record en_US
dc.relation.journal Journal of Political Economy -Chicago- en_US
dash.depositing.author Stein, Jeremy C.
dc.date.available 2010-03-01T21:02:50Z

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7219]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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