Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia

DSpace/Manakin Repository

dc.contributor.author	Stein, Jeremy C.
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-01T21:02:50Z
dc.date.issued	1988
dc.identifier.citation	Stein, Jeremy C. 1988. Takeover threats and managerial myopia. Journal of Political Economy 96(1): 61-80.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0022-3808	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3708937
dc.description.abstract	This paper examines the familiar argument that takeover pressure can be damaging because it leads managers to sacrifice long-term interests in order to boost current profits. If stockholders are imperfectly informed, temporarily low earnings may cause the stock to become undervalued, increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price; hence the managerial concern with current bottom line. The magnitude of the problem depends on a variety of factors, including the attitudes and beliefs o f shareholders, the extent to which corporate raiders have inside information, and the degree to which managers are concerned with retaining control of their firms.	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Economics	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	University of Chicago Press	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261524	en_US
dash.license	LAA
dc.title	Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.description.version	Version of Record	en_US
dc.relation.journal	Journal of Political Economy -Chicago-	en_US
dash.depositing.author	Stein, Jeremy C.
dc.date.available	2010-03-01T21:02:50Z