Two Auction-Based Resource Allocation Environments: Design and Experience

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Two Auction-Based Resource Allocation Environments: Design and Experience

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Title: Two Auction-Based Resource Allocation Environments: Design and Experience
Author: Vahdat, Amin; Snoeren, Alex C.; Shneidman, Jeffrey; Parkes, David; Ng, Chaki; Chun, Brent N.; Buonadonna, Phil; AuYoung, Alvin

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Citation: AuYoung, Alvin, Phil Buonadonna, Brent N. Chun, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Jeff Shneidman, Alex C. Snoeren, and Amin Vahdat. Two Auction-Based Resource Allocation Environments: Design and Experience. Market Oriented Grid and Utility Computing, Chapter 23.
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Abstract: Many computer systems have reached the point where the goal of resource
allocation is no longer to maximize utilization; instead, when demand
exceeds supply and not all needs can be met, one needs a policy to guide
resource allocation decisions. One natural policy is to seek efficient usage,
which allocates resources to the set of users who have the highest utility for
the use of the resources. Researchers have frequently proposed market-based
mechanisms to provide such a goal-oriented way to allocate resources
among competing interests while maximizing overall utility of the users.
Published Version: http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0470287683,descCd-tableOfContents.html
Other Sources: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/bib/date.html
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3710661
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