| Title: | Two Auction-Based Resource Allocation Environments: Design and Experience |
| Author: |
Vahdat, Amin; Snoeren, Alex C.; Shneidman, Jeffrey; Parkes, David; Ng, Chaki; Chun, Brent N.; Buonadonna, Phil; AuYoung, Alvin
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | AuYoung, Alvin, Phil Buonadonna, Brent N. Chun, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Jeff Shneidman, Alex C. Snoeren, and Amin Vahdat. Two Auction-Based Resource Allocation Environments: Design and Experience. Market Oriented Grid and Utility Computing, Chapter 23. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
auyoung_twoauction.pdf (515.8Kb; PDF)
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| Abstract: | Many computer systems have reached the point where the goal of resource allocation is no longer to maximize utilization; instead, when demand exceeds supply and not all needs can be met, one needs a policy to guide resource allocation decisions. One natural policy is to seek efficient usage, which allocates resources to the set of users who have the highest utility for the use of the resources. Researchers have frequently proposed market-based mechanisms to provide such a goal-oriented way to allocate resources among competing interests while maximizing overall utility of the users. |
| Published Version: | http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0470287683,descCd-tableOfContents.html |
| Other Sources: | http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/bib/date.html |
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| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3710661 |
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