| Title: | Mutation-Selection Equilibrium in Games with Multiple Strategies |
| Author: |
Antal, Tibor; Traulsen, Arne; Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Tarnita, Corina Elena; Nowak, Martin A.
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Antal, Tibor, Arne Traulsen, Hisashi Ohtsuki, Corina E. Tarnita, and Martin A. Nowak. 2009. Mutation–selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies. Journal of Theoretical Biology 258(4): 614-622. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
Nowak_MutationSelection.pdf (353.4Kb; PDF)
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| Abstract: | In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We explore stochastic evolutionary dynamics under weak selection, but for any mutation rate. We analyze the frequency dependent Moran process in well-mixed populations, but almost identical results are found for the Wright–Fisher and Pairwise Comparison processes. Surprisingly simple conditions specify whether a strategy is more abundant on average than 1/n, or than another strategy, in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We find one condition that holds for low mutation rate and another condition that holds for high mutation rate. A linear combination of these two conditions holds for any mutation rate. Our results allow a complete characterization of n×n games in the limit of weak selection. |
| Published Version: | doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010 |
| Other Sources: | http://www.ped.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/all_publications.html#2009 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3777793 |
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