Fair Package Assignment

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Fair Package Assignment

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Lahaie, Sébastien
dc.contributor.author Parkes, David C.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-04-19T17:08:41Z
dc.date.issued 2009
dc.identifier.citation Lahaie, Sébastien and David C. Parkes. 2009. Fair package assignment. In Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 14, ed. S. Das, M. Ostrovsky, D. Pennock and B. Szymanksi, 92. Berlin; New York: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. en_US
dc.identifier.isbn 978-3-642-03820-4 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3967320
dc.description.abstract We consider the problem of fair allocation in the package assignment model, where a set of indivisible items, held by single seller, must be efficiently allocated to agents with quasi-linear utilities. A fair assignment is one that is efficient and envy-free. We consider a model where bidders have superadditive valuations, meaning that items are pure complements. Our central result is that core outcomes are fair and even coalition-fair over this domain, while fair distributions may not even exist for general valuations. Of relevance to auction design, we also establish that the core is equivalent to the set of anonymous-price competitive equilibria, and that superadditive valuations are a maximal domain that guarantees the existence of anonymous-price competitive equilibrium. Our results are analogs of core equivalence results for linear prices in the standard assignment model, and for nonlinear, non-anonymous prices in the package assignment model with general valuations. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Engineering and Applied Sciences en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Springer Berlin Heidelberg en_US
dc.relation.isversionof doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_14 en_US
dc.relation.hasversion http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/lahaie09.pdf en_US
dash.license OAP
dc.title Fair Package Assignment en_US
dc.type Monograph or Book en_US
dc.description.version Accepted Manuscript en_US
dc.relation.journal Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications en_US
dash.depositing.author Parkes, David C.
dc.date.available 2010-04-19T17:08:41Z

Files in this item

Files Size Format View
Lahaie_Parkes_Fair.pdf 202.8Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • FAS Scholarly Articles [6463]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

Show simple item record

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters