Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions for General Valuations
| Title: | Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions for General Valuations |
| Author: |
Mishra, Debasis; Parkes, David C.
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Mishra, Debasis, and David C. Parkes. 2007. Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations. Journal of Economic Theory 132(1): 335-366. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
Mishra_Ascending.pdf (346.9Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | Ascending price auctions involving a single price path and buyers paying their final bid price cannot achieve the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) outcome in the combinatorial auctions setting. Using a notion called universal competitive equilibrium prices, shown to be necessary and sufficient to achieve the VCG outcome using ascending price auctions, we define a class of ascending price auctions in which buyers bid on a single price path. Truthful bidding by buyers is an ex post Nash equilibrium in such auctions. By giving discounts to buyers from the final price, the VCG outcome is achieved for general valuations. |
| Published Version: | doi:10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.004 |
| Other Sources: | http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/mishra_jet.pdf |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3996850 |
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