A Modular Framework for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
| Title: | A Modular Framework for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions |
| Author: |
Lahaie, Sébastien; Parkes, David C.
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Lahaie, Sébastien, and David C. Parkes. 2008. A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. SIGecom Exchanges 7(2). |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
Lahaie_Modular.pdf (101.3Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | We describe a modular elicitation framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. The framework includes proxy agents, each of which can adopt an individualized bidding language to represent partial value information of a bidder. The framework leverages algorithms from query learning to elicit value information via bids as the auction progresses. The approach reduces the multi-agent elicitation problem to isolated, single-agent learning problems, with competitive equilibrium prices used to facilitate auction clearing even without complete learning. |
| Published Version: | http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1399589.1399597 |
| Other Sources: | http://www.sigecom.org/exchanges/volume_7/2/lahaie.pdf |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4000332 |
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Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
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