A Modular Framework for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

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A Modular Framework for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

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Title: A Modular Framework for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
Author: Lahaie, Sébastien; Parkes, David C.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Lahaie, Sébastien, and David C. Parkes. 2008. A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. SIGecom Exchanges 7(2).
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Abstract: We describe a modular elicitation framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. The framework includes proxy agents, each of which can adopt an individualized bidding language to represent partial value information of a bidder. The framework leverages algorithms from query learning to elicit value information via bids as the auction progresses. The approach reduces the multi-agent elicitation problem to isolated, single-agent learning problems, with competitive equilibrium prices used to facilitate auction clearing even without complete learning.
Published Version: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1399589.1399597
Other Sources: http://www.sigecom.org/exchanges/volume_7/2/lahaie.pdf
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4000332

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7219]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

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