Handling Interdependent Values in an Auction Mechanism for Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks

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Handling Interdependent Values in an Auction Mechanism for Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks

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dc.contributor.author Klein, Mark
dc.contributor.author Moreno, Gabriel A.
dc.contributor.author Parkes, David C.
dc.contributor.author Plakosh, Daniel
dc.contributor.author Seuken, Sven
dc.contributor.author Wallnau, Kurt C.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-05-03T14:34:29Z
dc.date.issued 2008
dc.identifier.citation Klein, Mark, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Daniel Plakosh, Sven Seuken, and Kurt C. Wallnau. 2008. Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Economics of Networked Systems: August 22, 2008, Seattle, WA, ed. J. Feigenbaum; Y R. Yang, 73-78. New York, N.Y.: ACM Press. en_US
dc.identifier.isbn 978-1-60558-179-8 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4039780
dc.description.abstract We consider a tactical data network with limited bandwidth, in which each agent is tracking objects and may have value for receiving data from other agents. The agents are self-interested and would prefer to receive data than share data. Each agent has private information about the quality of its data and can misreport this quality and degrade or otherwise decline to share its data. The problem is one of interdependent value mechanism design because the value to one agent for the broadcast of data on an object depends on the quality of the data, which is privately known to the sender. A recent two-stage mechanism due to Mezzetti (2004) can be modified to our setting. Our mechanism achieves efficient bandwidth allocation and provides incentive compatibility by conditioning payments on the realized value for data shared between agents. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Engineering and Applied Sciences en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Association for Computing Machinery en_US
dc.relation.isversionof http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1403027.1403044 en_US
dc.relation.hasversion http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/klein08.pdf en_US
dash.license LAA
dc.subject interdependent values en_US
dc.subject mechanism design en_US
dc.subject sensor networks en_US
dc.title Handling Interdependent Values in an Auction Mechanism for Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks en_US
dc.type Monograph or Book en_US
dc.description.version Accepted Manuscript en_US
dc.relation.journal Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems en_US
dash.depositing.author Parkes, David C.
dc.date.available 2010-05-03T14:34:29Z

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7501]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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