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dc.contributor.author	Pacheco, Jorge M.
dc.contributor.author	Traulsen, Arne
dc.contributor.author	Ohtsuki, Hisashi
dc.contributor.author	Nowak, Martin A.
dc.date.accessioned	2010-05-10T13:42:55Z
dc.date.issued	2008
dc.identifier.citation	Pacheco, Jorge M., Arne Traulsen, Hisashi Ohtsuki, and Martin A. Nowak. 2008. Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking. Journal of Theoretical Biology 250(4): 723-731.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0022-5193	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4063695
dc.description.abstract	Direct reciprocity relies on repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here we examine the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity in dynamically structured populations. Individuals occupy the vertices of a graph, undergoing repeated interactions with their partners via the edges of the graph. Unlike the traditional approach to evolutionary game theory, where individuals meet at random and have no control over the frequency or duration of interactions, we consider a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions. Moreover, once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. Whenever the active dynamics of links is sufficiently fast, population structure leads to a simple transformation of the payoff matrix, effectively changing the game under consideration, and hence paving the way for reciprocators to dominate defectors. We derive analytical conditions for evolutionary stability.	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Mathematics	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Organismic and Evolutionary Biology	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	Elsevier	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.10.040	en_US
dash.license	LAA
dc.subject	dynamically structured populations	en_US
dc.subject	coevolution	en_US
dc.subject	structured populations	en_US
dc.subject	evolutionary game theory	en_US
dc.title	Repeated Games and Direct Reciprocity Under Active Linking	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.description.version	Author's Original	en_US
dc.relation.journal	Journal of Theoretical Biology	en_US
dash.depositing.author	Nowak, Martin A.
dc.date.available	2010-05-10T13:42:55Z

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  Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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