An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction
| Title: | An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction |
| Author: |
Parkes, David C.; Ungar, Lyle H.
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Parkes, David C., and Lyle H. Ungar. 2002. An ascending-price generalized Vickrey auction. Paper presented at the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop: The Economics of the Internet: June 25-29, 2002. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
Parkes_Ascending.pdf (398.9Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | A simple characterization of the equilibrium conditions required to compute Vickrey payments in the Combinatorial Allocation Problem leads to an ascending price Generalized Vickrey Auction. The ascending auc- tion, iBundle Extend & Adjust (iBEA), maintains non-linear and perhaps non-anonymous prices on bundles of items, and terminates with the ef- cient allocation and the Vickrey payments in ex post Nash equilibrium. Crucially, iBEA is able to implement the Vickrey outcome even when the Vickrey payments are not supported in a single competitive equilibrium. The auction closes with Universal competitive equilibrium prices, which provide enough information to compute individualized discounts to adjust the nal prices and implement Vickrey payments. |
| Published Version: | http://www.stanford.edu/group/SITE/ |
| Other Sources: | http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/iBEA.pdf |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4101692 |
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