An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction

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An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction

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Title: An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction
Author: Parkes, David C.; Ungar, Lyle H.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Parkes, David C., and Lyle H. Ungar. 2002. An ascending-price generalized Vickrey auction. Paper presented at the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop: The Economics of the Internet: June 25-29, 2002.
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Abstract: A simple characterization of the equilibrium conditions required to compute Vickrey payments in the Combinatorial Allocation Problem leads to an ascending price Generalized Vickrey Auction. The ascending auc- tion, iBundle Extend & Adjust (iBEA), maintains non-linear and perhaps non-anonymous prices on bundles of items, and terminates with the ef- cient allocation and the Vickrey payments in ex post Nash equilibrium. Crucially, iBEA is able to implement the Vickrey outcome even when the Vickrey payments are not supported in a single competitive equilibrium. The auction closes with Universal competitive equilibrium prices, which provide enough information to compute individualized discounts to adjust the nal prices and implement Vickrey payments.
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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [8087]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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