dc.contributor.author | Parkes, David C. | |
dc.contributor.author | Ungar, Lyle H. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-18T19:02:16Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Parkes, David C., and Lyle H. Ungar. 2002. An ascending-price generalized Vickrey auction. Paper presented at the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop: The Economics of the Internet: June 25-29, 2002. | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4101692 | |
dc.description.abstract | A simple characterization of the equilibrium conditions required to
compute Vickrey payments in the Combinatorial Allocation Problem leads
to an ascending price Generalized Vickrey Auction. The ascending auc-
tion, iBundle Extend & Adjust (iBEA), maintains non-linear and perhaps
non-anonymous prices on bundles of items, and terminates with the ef-
cient allocation and the Vickrey payments in ex post Nash equilibrium.
Crucially, iBEA is able to implement the Vickrey outcome even when the
Vickrey payments are not supported in a single competitive equilibrium.
The auction closes with Universal competitive equilibrium prices, which
provide enough information to compute individualized discounts to adjust
the nal prices and implement Vickrey payments. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Engineering and Applied Sciences | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://www.stanford.edu/group/SITE/ | en_US |
dc.relation.hasversion | http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/iBEA.pdf | en_US |
dash.license | LAA | |
dc.title | An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction | en_US |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en_US |
dc.description.version | Accepted Manuscript | en_US |
dash.depositing.author | Parkes, David C. | |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-18T19:02:16Z | |
dash.contributor.affiliated | Parkes, David | |