Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation

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Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation

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Title: Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation
Author: Ng, Chaki; Parkes, David C.; Seltzer, Margo I.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Ng, Chaki, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer. 2003. Virtual worlds: Fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation. In EC '03: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce: June 9-12, 2003,San Diego, California, ed. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Association for Computing Machinery, and Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce, 238-239. New York: ACM Press.
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Abstract: We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. The exchange is implemented as a sequence of auctions, with dynamically arriving requests from agents matched with each auction. Each auction is associated with some consignment of the resources from a single seller. We provide a simple Virtual Worlds (VW) construction, that extends a fast and strategyproof mechanism for a single auction to apply to this sequence-of-auctions setting. Rather than match each buyer with a single auction, the VW mechanism allows buyers to be considered for multiple auctions while retaining strategyproofness.
Published Version: doi:10.1145/779928.779977
Other Sources: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/virtual_short.pdf
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4101705

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [6868]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

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