Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms

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Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms

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Title: Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms
Author: Parkes, David C.; Cavallo, Ruggiero; Constantin, Florin; Singh, Satinder

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Parkes, David C., Ruggiero Cavallo, Florin Constantin, and Satinder Singh. Forthcoming. Dynamic incentive mechanisms. Artificial Intelligence Magazine.
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Abstract: Much of AI is concerned with the design of intelligent agents. A complementary challenge is to understand how to design “rules of encounter” (Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994) by which to promote simple, robust and beneficial interactions between multiple intelligent agents. This is a natural development, as AI is increasingly used for automated decision making in real-world settings. As we extend the ideas of mechanism design from economic theory, the mechanisms (or rules) become algorithmic and many new challenges surface. Starting with a short background on mechanism design theory, the aim of this paper is to provide a non-technical exposition of recent results on dynamic incentive mechanisms, which provide rules for the coordination of agents in sequential decision problems. The framework of dynamic mechanism design embraces coordinated decision making both in the context of uncertainty about the world external to an agent and also in regard to the dynamics of agent preferences. In addition to tracing some recent developments, we point to ongoing research challenges.
Published Version: http://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/aimagazine/index
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4481299

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7374]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

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