Endogenous Political Institutions

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Endogenous Political Institutions

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dc.contributor.author Trebbi, Francesco
dc.contributor.author Aghion, Philippe
dc.contributor.author Alesina, Alberto
dc.date.accessioned 2010-10-14T14:52:56Z
dc.date.issued 2004
dc.identifier.citation Aghion, Philippe, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Endogenous political institutions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 2: 565-611. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0033-5533 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4481498
dc.description.abstract A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice, we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both "optimal" constitutional design and "positive" aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Economics en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher MIT Press en_US
dc.relation.isversionof http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0033553041382148 en_US
dash.license LAA
dc.title Endogenous Political Institutions en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Version of Record en_US
dc.relation.journal Quarterly Journal of Economics en_US
dash.depositing.author Aghion, Philippe
dc.date.available 2010-10-14T14:52:56Z

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7495]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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