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dc.contributor.author	Trebbi, Francesco
dc.contributor.author	Aghion, Philippe
dc.contributor.author	Alesina, Alberto
dc.date.accessioned	2010-10-14T14:52:56Z
dc.date.issued	2004
dc.identifier.citation	Aghion, Philippe, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Endogenous political institutions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 2: 565-611.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0033-5533	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4481498
dc.description.abstract	A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice, we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both "optimal" constitutional design and "positive" aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Economics	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	MIT Press	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0033553041382148	en_US
dash.license	LAA
dc.title	Endogenous Political Institutions	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.description.version	Version of Record	en_US
dc.relation.journal	Quarterly Journal of Economics	en_US
dash.depositing.author	Aghion, Philippe
dc.date.available	2010-10-14T14:52:56Z

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